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INDIAN LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

Treaties made between the United States and Indian tribes
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often provided
that the tribes would retain the right to hunt and fish on the
lands set aside as Indian reservations or in other designated
areas "so long as game may be found . . . . "1 Executive Orders
or other documents which created or defined reservations often
specified that the land was to be used for "Indian purposes. "2
The term "Indian purposes" has been judicially interpreted to
include the guaranteed tribal right to hunt and fish on the
indicated lands, free of state or federal control.3
However, the simple and explicit guarantees of the early
treaties and Executive Orders have become confounded by the
complexities of the twentieth century, and confused by social
and political change. Congress, with its guardian-like powers
over Indian tribes, 4 has vacillated between a policy of forced
assimilation of Native Americans into the larger society, and
efforts to preserve and protect Indian rights and cultural heritage. 5
1. Treaty with the Crow Indians of 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650 (1868). For discussion of
Indian treaty terminology and interpretation, see Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review

of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Upon The Earth"- How
Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975).
2. See Exec. Order of January 9, 1884, establishing the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation "to be used for Indian purposes . . . ," reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES 832 (1903).
3. See United States v. Sturgeon, 27 F. Cas. 1357 (D. Nev. 1879). Similar terminology such as "to be held as Indian lands are held" has also been interpreted to include the
right to fish and hunt in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 40506 (1968).
4. For a detailed review of federal guardianship theory, see Carter, Race and Power

Politics As Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American Indians: Land Related
Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976).
5. For an overview of the history of federal Indian policy, see Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 12 (1976). The
often contradictory federal policies have been conveniently related to time periods in D.
GETCHES, D. RoSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1979) (hereinafter FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW). The authors delineate the periods of: treaty making, 1776-1871; allotment
and assimilation, 1871-1928; Indian reorganization, 1928-1945; tribal termination, 19451961; and Indian self-determination, 1961-present. Id.
The policy of allotment and assimilation was reflected by the General Allotment Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1976) (commonly referred to as the Dawes Act of 1887) which
divided Indian held lands on a per capita basis among tribe members, with individual
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The often contradictory actions of Congress have resulted in
a maze of federal, tribal and state jurisdiction over Indian
matters. S Where federal or state actions limit or affect the
exercise of Indian tribal rights, some tribes have responded by
asserting their explicit or implied treaty rights or other
guarantees. The courts are required to interpret the original
treaties and agreements in conjunction with subsequent congressional enactments. Applying traditional canons of federal
Indian law, the courts attempt to equitably balance guaranteed
tribal rights and conflicting state or federal interests. Indian tribal
hunting and fishing rights are primary areas of this conflict. 7
States have rarely contested the rights of the Indians
themselves to hunt and fish on their reservations, free of
regulation. 8 But this question has arisen when an Indian
Indians receiving a parcel of not more than 160 acres. The purpose of the policy was to
a88imilate Native Americans into the general society. To this end, the parcels assigned to
individual Indians were to be held in trust by the United States for a period of 25 years,
• after which the Indian owners could sell the land to non-Indians if they chose. As a further inducement to enter the major society, Indians who assumed "the habits of civilized
life" received United States citizenship. See History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on
H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 428·
89 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis) reprinted in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra, at 69.
The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1974), ended the allotment policy, prohibited alienation of Indian land except among
the tribes themselves and established a procedure for tribes to organize and adopt constitutions and by-laws, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. See Comment,
Tribal Self-Gouernment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 955
(1972). This reversal of the allotment and assimilation policy was itself reversed by the
subsequent federal termination policy. See 'the Concurrent Resolution Expressing the
Sense of Congress that Certain Tribes of Indians Should be Freed from Federal Supervision, H,R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess, (1953), amended, H.R. 1063, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953). H.R. 1063 was better known as Public Law 280, which expressly sought to
remove all federal supervision and control from effected Indian tribes. See Herzberg, The
Menominee Indians: Terminotion to Restoration, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 143 (1978). The
termination policy indicated Congress' return to a philosophy of assimilation of Indians
"into the mass of the population." See COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A REpORT TO CONGRESS (1949), quoted in
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra, at 86. In turn, the termination policy was replaced by the
federal self-determination policy, reflected by a "significant movement" by the federal
government toward "increased protection of Indian rights . . . . " Israel, The

Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reseruation Resource Deuelopment, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 624 (1976).
6. For a review of the complicated nature of jurisdiction on reservations, see
Vollmann, Criminol Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Souereignty and Defendants'
Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REv. 387 (1974).
7. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND-WHITE MAN'S LAw 196 (1971).
8. When the issue has been contested, courts have generally held that the states
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reservation was terminated by Congress, 8 and former Indian land
sold to non-Indians. At issue was whether treaty hunting and
fishing rights were tied to the land and therefore extinguished by
the transfer of the land from exclusive Indian control, or whether
those rights were independent and survived alienation of the
land. 10 Issues have also arisen as to who may exercise hunting
and fishing rights,lI and whether the rights extended to the
descendants of Indians who elected to terminate their tribal
membership and claims to tribal rights in return for monetary
settlements. 12
The recognition that wildlife is a valuable and exhaustible
resource has resulted in competition between state and tribal·
governments for the economic benefits derived from fishing and
hunting activities. As Indian tribes seek to develop and
encourage non-Indian use of on-reservation wildlife resources to
augment tribal income, states have attempted to impose
licensing requirements and to apply their fish and game
regulations to the non-Indian on-reservation activities. Conflict
has also arisen when the tribes and the states have differing
concepts of conservation and of the most effective methods of
preventing over-exploitation of the resource. Finally, controversies have arisen concerning the extent to which the tribes
and the states may regulate these non-Indian, on-reservation
activities.
Various aspects of Indian hunting and fishing rights were
brought before the Ninth Circuit in five cases in the last term. In
three of these cases,13 the court applied basic canons of federal
have no regulatory power over Indian on-reservation fishing. E.g., Moore v. United
States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1946); Pioneer Packing Co. v.
Winslow, 159 Wash. 655, 294 P. 557 (1930); Arnett v. Five GiJI Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d 454,
i21 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976). But see Puyallup Tribe, Inc.
v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th
. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979) (under strict standards, states may regulate Indian on-reservation fishing for conservation purposes).
9. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1974) (Kimball 1); see notes 7680 infra and accompanying text.
10. [d.
11. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kimballl1); see notes
81-108 infra and accompanying text.
12. [d. at 775-76.
13. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979) (per Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Goodwin and Anderson JJ.), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979); California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th
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Indian law to the questions presented and generally supported
the contentions of the Indian parties. In the other two cases, one
marked by a dissent, the court emphasized the federal
instrumentality theory. 14 The court held, in one case, that a state
may regulate non-Indian, on-reservation hunting and fishing
activities unless clearly and expressly preempted by Congress or
the tribe}S
While the cases are significant in their own right, and have
economic as well as cultural importance for the Indian litigants,
the court's interpretation and application of traditional
principles of federal Indian law in resolving the hunting and
fishing rights issues may be of even greater significance to other
areas of Indian law. This article will review the cases considered
by the court and examine the Ninth Circuit's findings on the
issues of tribal sovereignty, federal preemption and tribal
immunity from suit.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
European colonists early recognized Indian property rights
and made token affirmation of their validity to simplify the
Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were Takasugi, D.J., and
Carter, J.); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. July, 1979) (per Wright, J.;
the other panel members were Tang, J., and Palmieri, D.J.).
14. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. Sept., 1979) (per Sneed, J.;
the other panel members were Anderson, J., and Williams, D.J.) petition for cert. filed,
48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79-1128); Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy,
J.; Duniway, J., dissenting; the other panel member was Grant, D.J.). The term "federal instrumentality" refers to an agency or property of the federal government which is immune from state control or taxation due to its purpose as an instrument of federal policy.
Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 20 A.2d 455, 458 (1941). "Federal preemption" doctrine prevents state regulation or involvement in areas in which the federal
government has indicated the intent to exclude state action, or where dual regulation would
hamper or obstruct federal policy. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell, 303
U.S. 177 (1938). As applied to Indian tribes, federal instrumentality theory has shielded
tribal on-reservation enterprises from state regulation, and similarly, prevented state
taxation of salaries earned on a reservation by individual Indians. McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). In Confederated Tribes, the Ninth Circuit applied
a hybrid of federal instrumentality theory and federal preemption doctrine, resulting in
tribal immunity from state regulation only where the tribe or the federal government has
explicitly and expressly indicated the intent to exclude a state government. Significantly,
this novel theory removes from a state the burden of proving that state involvement would
not hamper a federal policy, and requires instead that an Indian tribe show that the state
action will materially interfere with a policy or goal of the tribe. See Kissel, note 207 infra.
15. 591 F.2d at 93.
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occupation of Indian lands. Ie Indian rights are, therefore, among
the oldest in our system of law and predate the United States
Constitution. The United States continued to recognize Indian
rights and to negotiate with the Indian tribes as sovereign
nations l7 in order to minimize conflict and to provide a means of
national expansion. 18
The traditional means employed by the United States to gain
concessions of land from the Indian tribes was the negotiation of
treaties, often supported by a military presence. ID Since the power
to make treaties with Indian tribes is derived from the
Constitution, treaties are considered the supreme law of the land
and may not be contravened by state law.20 Although the practice
of entering into treaties with Indian tribes ended in 1871, treaties
made prior to that date continue in effect unless superseded by
subsequent congressional acts. 21
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes,22 and may
therefore enact legislation which contradicts or abrogates a prior
treaty, but only if that intent is expressly stated in the
subsequent act.23 The termination of treaty rights requires either
a clear statement or conclusive legislative history which reflects
the intent to abrogate the rights. z4 That intent may not be
merely implied or imputed to Congress. 25
16. Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 L. &
CONTEMP. PROD. 12, 14·15 (1976).
17. Id. at 16. See also W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 210·14 (1975).
18. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note I, at 608·09.
19. Id. at 609·10. Cf. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (the Court
notes that treaty negotation was not at arm's length, but "[rlather, treaties were imposed
upon [the Indiansj and they had no choice but to consent," id. at 630·31.).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides Congress the power "[tjo regulate Com·
merce . . . with the Indian Tribes . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 grants to the
President the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea·
ties . . . . " See United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876).
21. The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976), provided that the
United States would not form treaties with the Indian tribes after 1871, but no existing
treaties would be affected or invalidated by the Act. See Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 201·02 (1975).
22. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565·66 (1903).
23. E.g., United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); United States v. White, 508
F.2d 453, 456·57 (8th Cir. 1974).
24. For a detailed analysis of the difference between clear or expreas statement and
conclusive legislative history as bases for treaty right abrogation, see Wilkinson &
Volkman, supra note I, at 645·61.
25. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412·13 (1968).
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Traditionally, Indian treaties reserved certain lands for the
exclusive use of the Indian tribes, and provided for the payment
of cash and services to the tribes. In return, the tribes ceded to
the United" States other lands claimed by the Indians. Indian
rights of hunting and fishing, have been considered exclusive for
the tribes on retained reservation land. However, on the ceded
land, these rights became non-exclusive 28 and are referred to as
off-reservation rights.
The evolution of federal Indian law has resulted in the
formulation of basic rules of treaty construction. Central to
treaty interpretation is the theory of reserved rights, which holds
that the powers of Indian tribes are not granted by Congress, but
derive from tribal sovereignty based on the original possession of
the land.27 Treaties are therefore "not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those
not granted."28
In addition, courts require that ambiguous prOVISIOns of
treaties be construed as the Indian signatories would have
understood them.2V The principle that treaties are to be
interpreted liberally in favor of Indian tribes has not been
consistently applied. 30 Nevertheless, many courts follow the
"express statement rule," requiring, for effective abrogation, a
subsequent Congressional act that explicitly abrogates treaty
rights. 31
The jurisdictional conflict arising from claims of federal and
state governments and Indian tribes over on-reservation matters
results from three contradictory theories. First, tribes claim the
right of self-government based on the argument that at the time
26. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 399 (1968) (Puyallup
I). Non-exclusive means that a right which formerly included the power to exclude nontribe members from participation has been transformed to a right which is shared in
common with non-tribe members.
27. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
28. [d. at 381.
29. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
406 (1968); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175
U.S. 1 (1899); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 5t)1-53 (1832).
30. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
31. E.g., United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456-57 (8th Cir. 1974).
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of the early treaties, tribes were considered sovereign nations. 32
Although . some rights were relinquished by treaty, or were
abrogated by Congress, those not expressly terminated continued
as reserved rights and support tribal sovereignty and onreservation self-government. 33 Second, federal claims to onreservation jurisdiction derive from the United States
Constitution 34 and from the judicially created theory that the
federal government has assumed a guardian relationship in which
the Indian tribes are viewed as wards requiring protection. 35
Finally, state claims to on-reservation jurisdiction reflect the
doctrine that states possess original and complete sovereignty over
their territory, except as limited by the Constitution or by
conditions expressly imposed at the time of entry to the Union. 3s
State claims are federally preempted in many areas. They may
also be superceded by the principles that treaties are the supreme
law of the land, and that Indian tribes possess a unique
sovereignty somewhat similar to that of the United States. 37 Even
when inherent on-reservation state jurisdiction is absent,
however, Congress may delegate it to the states, as they did in
Public Law 280,38 which transferred federal jurisdiction to certain
states 39 for civil and criminal matters arising on reservations.
32. E.g., K. KICKINGBIRD, L. KICKINGBIRD, C. CHIBI'M'Y & C. BERKEY, INDIAN SOVER·
ElGNTY 6 (1977). This is a workbook of Indian law, developed by the Institute for the
Development of Indian Law, Washington, D.C. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 532, 559 (1832).
33. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at xviii-xix.
34. The commerce clause provides Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . . "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. The commerce clause is usually combined with the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2, to support federal on-reservation jurisdiction. The courts have refused to consider whether this jurisdictional claim is valid,
stating that it is a "political question" left to the discretion of Congre88. See United
States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
35. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See also Carter, supra note 4.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 and amend.X.
37. This sovereignty, which includes immunity from suit, is possessed only by tribes,
not by individual Indians. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978);
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (Puyallup III);
California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979).
38. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified as amended in various
sections of 18, 25 and 28 U.S.C.). See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State
Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975).
39. Originally Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin were
granted civil and criminal jurisdiction, with some limitations. Jurisdiction could be assumed by other states without the requirement of Indian consent. In 1968, Congress enacted a provision requiring consent from effected Indians prior to the assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (Supp. 1976).
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arising on reservations.
In considering on-reservation jurisdiction, all former
reservation land, even if sold to non-Indians, remains legally
defined as "Indian Country"40 unless expressly severed by
Congress}' The intent of Congress to sever former reservation
land must be explicitly stated on the face of the act permitting
alienation from Indian possession, or be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and the legislative history.42
In reviewing the hunting and fishing rights cases before it
this term, the Ninth Circuit has produced inconsistent results.
In some cases, the court considered some of the principles of
federal Indian law, applying and extending them; in other cases,
however, the court used an interpretation of federal
instrumentality doctrine which defines Indian tribes as a mere
arm of the federal government. 43 The Ninth Circuit's use of
instrumentality doctrine has been described both as "a
substantial threat to tribal sovereignty, "44 and as an effective
negation of the "independent tribal authority to self-govern."45
This view is borne out by the court's holding.
III. KIMBALL V. CALLAHAN: THE EFFECT OF TRIBAL
TERMINATION ON TREATY RIGHTS
In Kimball v. Callahan 48 (Kimball In, the court reviewed
the effect of tribal termination on tribal and individual treaty
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) defines Indian Country as:
(a) al\ land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-ofway running through the reservation, (b) 81\ dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-ways running through the same.
41. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973).
~
42. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington,
591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979).
44. Kissel, The Ninth Circuit's Federal Instrumentality Doctrine-A Threat to Tribal Sovereignty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358, 384 (1978).
45. Id. at 358.
46. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979).
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rights. The court affirmed the findings entered in a previous case
by the same name,47 and extended the holding to the descendants
of tribe members who had terminated their tribal affiliation. A
review of the history of the Klamath Reservation and of the
legislative and judicial background which shaped the issues
considered by the Ninth Circuit last term will be helpful for a
clearer understanding of Kimball II.

A.

BACKGROUND

In 1864, members of the Klamath and Modoc Indian Tribes
and of the Yahuskin Band of Snake Indians 48 signed a treaty
with representatives of the United States. 49 In return for cash
payments and services from the federal government, 50 the Indian
signatories ceded tribal land claims in southern Oregon and
northern California to the United States. The treaty provided
that certain land "within the country ceded by this treaty, shall,
until otherwise directed by the President of the United States,
be set apart as a residence for said Indians, [and be] held and
regarded as an Indian Reservation . . . ."51 A provision of the
treaty guaranteed the Indians "the exclusive right of taking fish
in the streams and lakes included in said reservation.'-'52 No
mention was made in the treaty of hunting or trapping rights. 53
47. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974) (Kimball!).
48. The Klamath and Modoc Tribes were related and originally referred to themselves as Maklaks. After the division of the Tribes, the Klamaths referred to themselves
as Eukskni, and the Modocs apparently assumed their present name. The various bands
referred to as the Yahuskin Snake group were also known as Paiutes, Shoshones or by the
band names Yahuskin and Walpapi.
49. The 1864 treaty, referred to as the Council Grove Treaty of October 14, 1864, 16
Stat. 707 (1869), was actually the second treaty negotiated with the Klamath and Modoc
Tribes. On February 14, 1864, the Tribes entered into a treaty by which they agreed to
live in peace, subject themselves to the jursidiction of the United States, and permit
travel by non-Indians through their land. In return the Tribes received two blankets and
some food, and similar rights to travel through the non-Indian settlements if unarmed.
The first treaty, which ceded no land, was rejected by the federal Indian Bureau as improper and void. The subsequent Council Grove Treaty resulted in the cession by the
Tribes of approximately "twelve to fourteen million" acres of land claimed by the Indians, and was ratified by Congress in 1869. R. Du..LON, BURNT-OUT FIRES 20 (1973). The
treaty was objected to by some members of the Modoc Tribe, and resulted in the socalled Modoc War in 1873. For an historical perspective of the treaty negotiations, see id.
50. For a statement of the payments and services to be provided the Tribes, see
Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707 (1869); R. DILLON, supra note 49, at 62; Pearson,
Hunting Rights: Retention of Treaty Rights After Termination-Kimball v. Callahan, 4
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 121, 122 (1976).
51. Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 708 (1869).
52. [d.
53. [d.
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In creating the reservation, Congress assumed civil and
criminal jurisdiction over matters arising within reservation
boundaries. 54 In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280,55 which
transferred this jurisdiction to Oregon, and represented the
initiation of the federal termination policy.58 Public Law 280
expressly exempted treaty fishing, hunting and trapping from
state regulation. 57 To implement the termination policy,
Congress passed the 1954 Klamath Termination ActaS which
established a tribal membership roll closed to additions after
August, 1954. 58 This Act provided for termination of the
reservation and sale of former reservation lands to both Indians
and non-indians, to be final in 1961. 80 Tribe members could
withdraw from the tribe and receive a monetary share of tribal
holdings, or receive a parcel of the former reservation land and
participate in an Indian-developed corporation intended to
oversee the land remaining in Indian possession. Similar to the
exemption prOVISIon of Public Law 280, the Klamath
Termination Act provided that nothing in the Act would
"abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe or the
members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty."81 Unlike Public
Law 280, however, the Klamath Termination Act included no
statement concerning hunting or trapping rights.
The federal termination policy, and the combined effect of
Public Law 280 and the Klamath Termination Act resulted in
54. The federal assumption of on-reservation jurisdiction included in the Treaty of
Oct. 14, 1864 was based on the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2. See note
34 supra.
55. See notes 38-40 supra.
56. See note 5 supra.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976).
58. Act of August 13, 1954, ch. 732 § I, 68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564564x (1976)).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 564(b) (1976) states:
At midnight of August 13, 1954, the roll of the tribe shall be
closed and no child born thereafter shall be eligible for enrollment: Provided, That the tribe shaH have a period of six
months from August 13, 1954, in which to prepare and submit
to the Secretary a proposed roll of the members of the tribe
living on August 13, 1954, [the date of this Act] which shall be
published in the Federal Register.
00. 25 U.S.C. § 564a(d) (1976) states: " 'Tribal property' means any real or personal
property, including water rights, or any interest in real or personal property, that belongs
to the tribe and either is held by the United States in trust for the tribe or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the Unites States."
61. 25 U.S.C. § 564m(b) (1976).
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litigation requmng nearly twenty-five years of treaty and
statutory analysis by federal courts. These cases reflect an
inconsistent application of federal Indian law principles, and
included disapproval of a prior Ninth Circuit decision which the
appellate court noted "could not stand"62 in light of a United
States Supreme Court case 63 which involved similar issues and
affirmed traditional Indian law principles.
The cases preceding Kimball II64 began in 1956, after the
enactment of the Klamath Termination Act, but prior to the
final termination of the Klamath Reservation in 1961. In
Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison (Klamath 1),65 the tribes
brought suit to enjoin Oregon from enforcing its game laws
against tribe members hunting and trapping on the reservation.
Applying the principle that Indian treaties must be interpreted
as the Indian signatories would have understood them, the
district court found that the guarantee of fishing rights in the
Klamath Treaty impliedly included hunting and trapping
rights." These implied treaty rights were included in the express
exemption from state regulation contained in Public Law 280.
Therefore, Oregon was precluded from extending its game law
enforcement to Indian on-reservation hunting and trapping,61
In 1964, three years after termination of the Klamath
Reservation, tribe members who had elected to maintain tribal
affiliation, contested Oregon's contention that the hunting,
trapping and fishing rights established in Klamath 1 were
extinguished by the termination of the reservation. In Klamath
and Modoc Tribes v. Maison (Klamath II), the Ninth Circuit
failed to apply the federal Indian law principle that treaty rights
may be abrogated only by an express indication of Congress'
intent to do SO.68 The appellate court found that treaty rights
were tied to the existence of the reservation, and were
62. 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1974), referring to Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964), which held that treaty rights of the Tribes on the
reservation were extinguished on all land transferred from Indian control to federal or
private ownership as a result of the Klamath Termination Act. 338 F.2d at 623.
63. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See notes 77 to 79 infra
and accompanying text.
64. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Or. 1956).
66. [d. at 637.
67. [d. at 636-37.
68. 338 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1964); see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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extinguished unless expressly extended by the Klamath
Termination Act, thereby permitting Oregon to apply state fish
and game regulations to tribe members hunting or fishing on
former reservation lands.
Four years later, in Menominee Tribe v. United States,69 the
Supreme Court considered the effect of the 1954 termination of
the Menominee Tribe and reservation by Congress, rejecting the
Klamath II reasoning. The Court found that the language of the
Treaty of Wolf River of 1854,70 setting aside the Wolf River
reservation "for a home" for the Menominee Tribe, "to be held
as Indian lands are held"71 implied the tribal right to hunt and
fish even if not specifically stated. The Supreme Court applied
the Winans 72 doctrine which established that a treaty be
construed as "the Indians . . . understood it, and as justice and
reason demand . . . . "73 The Court, observing that "the
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly
imputed to Congress,"74 found that the fishing and hunting
rights of the Menominee Tribe had not been extinghished by the
Menominee Termination Act. 7G The findings in Menominee had
a signficant impact on the Ninth Circuit six years later when the
effect of tribal and reservation termination were again brought
before the appellate court in Kimball [.
The plaintiffs in Kimball [were Klamath Reservation Indians
whose ancestors, or who themselves had elected to withdraw from
the tribe, pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act. Their
interest in tribal property had been converted to money and paid
to them, and thus had been transferred to the United States or
private ownership. Even so, the plaintiffs maintained Othat their
individual treaty rights to fish, hunt and trap on the former
reservation lands, free of state regulation, survived termination
and withdrawal from the tribe. The Indians sought a declaration
of their rights and an injunction to prevent Oregon from enforcing
its game laws against tribe members on former reservation lands.

69.
70.
71.
72.

391 U.S. 404 (1968).
Treaty of Wolf River, 1854, 10 Stat. 1064, 1065, art. 2 (1854).
391 U.S. at 406 (1968).
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying note 27

supra.

73. 198 U.S. at 380.
74. 391 U.S. at 413, quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934).
75. [d. at 412-13.
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After the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted,78 the plaintiffs
appealed. The Ninth Circuit noted that its finding in Klamath
11,77 that treaty rights tied to the reservation did not survive
termination, could not stand subsequent to Menominee u.
United States. The Kimball I court held that Klamath
Reservation Indians who withdrew from the tribe and received a
monetary share of tribal holdings nevertheless retained treaty
rights to hunt and fish on former reservation lands free of state
regulation. 78 The court, compelled by Menominee to find for the
Indian plaintiffs, stated that the Termination Act could not be
construed as "a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and
fishing rights of these Indians."7' The Ninth Circuit then
remanded the case to the district court for further hearing on the
issue of state regulation of Indian hunting and fishing on the
former reservation lands for the purposes of conservation.
On remand, the district court held that hunting, fishing and
trapping based on treaty rights were exempt from state
regulation and that these rights also extended to the descendants
of all Indians included on the tribal roll at the date of
termination. 80 Oregon appealed, and last term the case again came
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
B.

Kimball u. Callahan (Kimball II)

Oregon's appeal from the district court decision presented
the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to review and clarify its
findings in Kimball!. In Kimball II, the appellate court affirmed
the district court's findings and considered the additional issue
of whether the state could regulate Indian fishing and hunting on
former reservation lands for the purpose of conservation. 81
In its argument, Oregon maintained that the appellate court
should reconsider the state contentions that: (1) only those
Indians on the final tribal roll could exercise tribal rights; (2) that
persons born after the closing of the tribal roll on August 13,
76. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d at 565.
77. 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964).
78. 493 F.2d at 569-70.
79. [d. at 568, citing Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. at 412.
SO. Kimball v. Callahan 590 F.2d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. [d. at 775-77.
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1954, were not entitled to exercise treaty rights; (3) that treaty
rights could not be exercised on land disposed of to the federal
government or to private purchasers; and (4) that the state could
regulate the exercise of treaty rights to hunt and fish on former
reservation lands by members of the tribes for conservation
purposes. The state argued that these issues extended beyond
those in Kimball I, that the findings in Kimball I were
inconsistent with subsequent cases82 and that new evidence of
the legislative history of the Klamath Termination Act would
dictate a different result.
In dismissing the state's contentions, the appellate court
reviewed each case cited by Oregon as inconsistent with Kimball
I. The court first considered its own holding in United States u.
Washington 83 and a court of claims decision in White/oot u.
United States,84 and distinguished Kimball I, noting that neither
Washington nor White/oot dealt with the rights of individual
Indians after the termination of a tribe. The panel observed that
the Kimball I decision was not based on retained treaty rights
flowing from tribal property rights; rather, since the Kimball I
plaintiffs had elected withdrawal the decision was expressly
based on individual treaty rights unconnected with land posseSSIOn.
In further analyzing Washington and White/oot, the court
discussed individual user rights to the tribal property. Klamath
Reservation Indians had individual user rights to the tribal
treaty rights of hunting, fishing, and trapping on their
reservation prior to the Klamath Termination Act. Kimball I
found that the Termination Act did not extinguish those tribal
rights. Consequently, the individual Indians did not suffer the
82. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup Ill);
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976); White foot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818
(1962).
83. 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). In Washington,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision of Senior District Judge Boldt that
various treaties guaranteed 14 tribes the opportunity to take "up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that may be taken by all fisherman . . . . " 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.O.
Wash. 1974). The so-called "Boldt Decision" and its progeny have caused considerable
controversy. See note 209 infra and accompanying text.
84. 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961). In Whitefoot, the court of claims held that the inundation of tribal fishing areas by a dam had been compensated by payment to the tribe,
and that no separate compensation was owing to individual Indians. Id. at 675.
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loss of their user rights. Thus, the court concluded that nothing
in Washington or Whitefoot was contrary to this aspect of
Kimball 1.85
The appellate court next turned to the state's argument that
Kimball I was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup IIIJ.86 The
Ninth Circuit again distinguished Kimball I, observing that
unlike the Indians in Puyallup III, the Klamath Reservation
Indians were not seeking exclusive rights to hunt and fish on the
former reservation lands. The court held that although the
transfer or modification of reservation lands may affect treaty
rights by converting them from exclusive to non-exclusive, the
non-exclusive rights to fish, hunt and trap on former reservation
lands were protected by the Klamath Treaty provision 87
guaranteeing the "exclusive right of taking fish."88 That right,
and the judicially implied rights to hunt and trap survived
termination, but were rendered non-exclusive by the alienation
of the land from Indian ownership.
Having dismissed the argument that Washington, Whitefoot
and Puyallup III were inconsistent with Kimball I, the court
considered the state's second major contention: that the
legislative history not considered by the first Kimball court
required a contrary result. This legislative history, which the
Kimball I panel had specifically found lacking, reflected the
intent of Congress to extinguish the treaty rights to hunt, fish
and trap on former reservation lands according to Oregon. The
state presented evidence of the legislative history of the 1958
amendments89 to the Klamath Termination Act, contending they
reflected the intent of Congress to terminate treaty rights of
Indians who elected to withdraw. The Kimball II court found
nothing in the new material that indicated an intent by Congress
to abrogate the Klamath Reservation Indians' treaty rights. 90
Finding nothing in the state's contentions that supported
85. 590 F.2d at 773.
86. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
87. 590 F.2d at 774.
88. 493 F .2d at 566.
89. Act of August 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-731, § 1, 72 Stat. 816 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 564w-1 (1976)).
90. 590 F.2d at 775.
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reconsideration on issues decided in the first appeal, the court
concluded that the Kimball I decision that "withdrawn tribal
members retained their treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap on
the lands constituting their ancestral Klamath Indian
Reservation, including land constituting United States forest
lands and privately owned land on which hunting, fishing and
trapping is permitted," was the law of the case. D! Thus, the court
rejected the state's challenges to Kimball I, and in so doing
supported and clarified that case.
The court next considered the extension of treaty rights to
tribal roll member descendants who were born subsequent to the
closing of the roll. This question had not arisen in Kimball I. To
support its contendion that individuals born after the tribal roll
was closed enjoyed no treaty rights, the state argued that the
Klamath Termination Act expressly provided that individuals
born after the 1954 closing date could not subsequently be
enrolled. The state maintained that an individual must have had
tribal membership status and been enrolled to share in tribal
property or rights. Rejecting this argument, the court observed
that although the Klamath Termination Act was final in
terminating federal services to the Indians and federal supervision
of reservations, the Act clearly contemplated the continuing
existence of tribal organizations. The power of the tribe to act
under a tribal constitution and by-laws consistent with the
Termination Act was unaffected. 92
The court noted that the Klamath Tribe maintained a tribal
government and that the tribal constitution established criteria
for membership in the tribe. 93 The tribal roll was created only to
determine who should share in the distribution of tribal property
disposed of pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act.
Reasoning that since the tribe retained the power to establish
membership criteria and to permit eligible individuals to join,
and since Kimball I decided that the Act did not extinguish
tribal treaty rights to hunt, trap and fish. the court found these
rights were bestowed on all descendants of persons on the final
roll.U The appellate court therefore upheld the district court
91.
92.
93.
94.

[d.
[d. at 776.
[d.
[d.
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finding that the Termination Act did not limit treaty hunting,
fishing and trapping rights to persons on the final tribal roll of
1954, and that those rights were extended to eligible descendents
of individuals listed on the final roll.95 The Ninth Circuit also
affirmed the lower court finding that the Termination Act did
not affect the tribe's authority to regulate the exercise of these
rights by individual Indians.
The Kimball II court next turned to the question of state
regulation of Indian hunting and fishing on former reservation
lands for the purpose of conservation. The court noted a series of
cases which established state power to regulate, while not
prohibiting treaty-protected fishing, in the interest of conservation so long as the regulations met appropriate standards
and did not discriminate against Indians. 96 These cass held
that a state must demonstrate that both the imposed fishing
and hunting regulations and their application to Indians
are reasonable and necessary to conservation. 97 Observing that
the Klamath Indians were not seeking exclusive rights to hunt,
fish and trap on the former reservation lands, and further that
the General Council of the Klamath Tribe had adopted a
comprehensive scheme of joint hunting regulation with the state,
the court noted the tribe's recognition of state authority to
reasonably regulate Indian hunting, fishing and trapping for
conservation purposes. 9S In dispute, however, was the extent of
the state's authority.
The Klamaths maintained that the Ninth Circuit should
decide the appropriate extent of state regulation for conservation, while Oregon argued that the issue should be decided
by the federal district court. The appellate court ruled that
the matter should be remanded to the lower court for the
"development of a factual record which would serve as a basis
for establishing regulations within the scope of the state's right
to regulate the Indians' treaty rights. "99 Also, the district court
95. Id.
96. Id., citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165,177 (1977)
(Puyallup III); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Department of Game (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
97. 590 F.2d at 776-77.
98. Id. at 777.
99.Id.
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should formulate standards based on the evidence presented,
and in keeping with the applicable guidelines of Puyall~p [,
[[100 and IIpoI. If the parties proved unable to agree upon the
appropriate scope of the state's authority, the district court was
to do SO.102 Having established a procedure to resolve future
disputes between the litigants, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for implementation.
C.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kimball II reaffirmed and
extended the court's earlier holding in Kimball [ that Indian
treaty rights are not dependent on the continued possession of
reservation lands. This case is of particular significance to tribes
whose reservations and tribal status were terminated as a result
of Congress' termination policy. The decision in Kimball II is
equally important to tribes and individual Indians who are
permitted by Congress to sell their reservation lands to nonIndians. This alienation of Indian land to non-Indians, while
altering hunting, fishing and other treaty rights from exclusive to
non-exclusive, will no longer be a complete and conclusive
surrender of these rights. Where the former reservation land is
transferred to the federal government, or where the private
purcpaser allows hunting, fishing and trapping of the land,
the treaty rights may be exercised by Indians, free of state
regulations except those that are reasonable and necessary for
conservation purposes.
Of overriding importance, however, is the Ninth Circuit's
affirmation of the principle that the intent to abrogate or modify
Indian treaty rights must be expressly stated, and may not be
100. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.

101. 590 F.2d at 768,777, citing Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (Puyallup /II); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup
/l); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I). The
Puyallup cases arose in Washington over state efforts to regulate Indian off-reservation
treaty fishing. In Puyallup [, the first case to permit state regulation of a treaty right, the
Court affirmed Washington's power to regulate off-reservation treaty fishing for
conservation purposes. The standard established in Puyallup [was that state regulation of
Indian treaty fishing had to be "necessary for the conservation of fish . . . . " 391 U.S. at
399. The regulation could not discriminate against Indians. [d. at 398. In Puyallup II, a
state regulation prohibiting the use of gill nets was invalidated because it discriminated
against Indians. 414 U.S. at 48. In Puyallup III, the power of the state to regulate treaty
fishing was extended to on-reservation Indian fishing, under the standards previously
established. 433 U.S. at 175-77.
102. 590 F.2d 768, 777.
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lightly imputed to Congress. The earlier Ninth Circuit finding in
Klamath III03 that treaty rights were, by implication, altered to
mere statutory grants by the Klamath Termination Act,
represented what the Supreme Court termed a "backhanded"
abrogation of treaty rights. 104 In applying the strictest test for
abrogation of treaty rights, the Ninth Circuit provided a
significant safeguard to the continued exercise of Indian treaty
rights.
Although Kimball II affirmed and extended Kimball I,
there was a distinct difference in the tenor of the two decisions.
In Kimbal 1,105 the Ninth Circuit showed a subtle antagonism
at being "compelled"108 by the Supreme Court decision in
Menominee. Although the Ninth Circuit panel found that its
earlier holding in Klamath II could no longer stand following
Menominee, the appellate court seemed reluctant to adopt the
Menominee reasoning as its own.I07 In Kimball II this apparent
reluctance was absent. The court appeared more certain and
consistent in its application of traditional federal Indian law
principles. If the Ninth Circuit has adopted the traditional
canons of treaty and federal Indian law interpretation, future
court decisions will reflect more consistency and predictability.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's application of the federal
instrumentality theory in Cf!nfederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, lOS indicates that such
optimism about the Ninth Circuit's adoption of traditional
standards should be guarded.
IV.

CALIFORNIA V. QUECHAN TRIBE OF INDIANS:
A TEST OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

In a second case regarding tribal hunting and fishing rights,
California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians,109 the Ninth Circuit
considered the issues of tribal sovereignty and tribal sovereign
immunity from suit. The case arose when California sought a
declaration of the state's right to send state game wardens onto
103. 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964).
104. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. at 412.
105. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974). See also text accompanyingnotes 70-79 supra.
106. 493 F.2d at 567.
107. [d. at 568.
108. 591 F.2d 89 (1979). See text accompanying notes 190-203 infra.
109. 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members
were Carter, J., and Takasugi, D.J.).
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the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation to enforce state game laws on
non-Indians hunting and fishing on the reservation with tribal
permission. IIO The Quechan Tribe challenged the power of the
state to bring the suit. The appellate court reviewed the principle of tribal immunity from suit, and considered whether the
fact that the suit was brought by a state government negated
the tribe's immunity.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Quechan Tribe of Indians was organized pursuant to
the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. 111 The
tribe resides on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation located in
southern California and Arizona, along the Colorado River. The
reservation land was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1884, to be used for "Indian purposes."112 The Quechan Tribe adopted a constitution and bylaws which became
effective in 1936, and has exercised powers of self-government
since that date. Article XI of the tribal bylaws states "the
[Quechan Tribal] Council shall pass ordinances for the control of
hunting and fishing upqn the reservation consistent with Federal
laws and applicable game preservation practices."113 The council
adopted various ordinances under Article XI requiring nonIndians who hunt or fish on reservation lands to possess a tribal
trespass permit, or be subject to arrest by tribal game wardens
for criminal trespass."· Non-Indian trespassers are transferred
to federal authorities to be prosecuted for unauthorized entry
onto an Indian reservation for the purpose of hunting or fishing,
which is a federal crime. 1II
As originally enacted, the tribal ordinances required nonIndians to possess a valid California hunting or fishing license if
engaging in those activities, and to observe state game laws
110. [d. at 1154.
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1974). See note 5 supra.
112. Executive Order of January 9, 1884, reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 2, at
832, cite'd in California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969, 970 (S.D. Cal.
1977), vacated, 595 F.2d 1153.
113. 424 F. Supp. at 971.
114. [d.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976) makes it a crime for anyone "without lawful authority
or permission, willfully and knowingly [to go] upon any land that belongs to any Indian
or Indian tribe, band, or group . . . for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing

.
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while on the reservation. liB In 1975, however, the tribal council
enacted Tribal Ordinance QT-1-75, which deleted the provisions
requiring compliance with California game laws while on the
reservation and established that a California license was not
required of non-Indians if a tribal permit to hunt and fish on the
reservation was obtained.1I7 Tribal game wardens, commissioned
as Deputy Special Officers of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were
empowered to cite non-Indian trespassers, and procedures for the
disposition of the charges were established. The tribe imposed
neither hunting seasons nor limits on the quantity of fish or
game that could be taken on the reservation by non-Indians. liS
Prior to the adoption of Ordinance QT-1-75, the California
Department of Fish and Game regularly sent game wardens onto
the reservation lands to enforce state game laws ll9 on non-Indian
hunting and fishing. In July, 1975, the tribal council informed
the Department that the regulation of hunting and fishing on the
reservation was the exclusive right of the council, and that nonIndians would no longer be required to possess California game
licenses. The council indicated that California game wardens
attempting to enforce state game laws on the reservation would
be arrested by tribal authorities for trespass. The state then
sought a declaratory judgment of its authority to apply state
game laws to non-Indians hunting or fishing on the reservation,
and to have state game wardens enter the reservation to enforce
the state regulations.
The federal district court held that California game wardens
could, in a prohibitory manner only,'20 apply state fish and game
regulations to non-Indians hunting or fishing on reservation
lands,l21 The court also found, however, that having failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest, state game wardens were
116. 424 F. Supp. at 971.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. License requirements are provided for at CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1050-1110
(West Supp. 1979). Indian tribe members are generally exempt. CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE § 12300 (West Supp. 1979).
120. The phrase "prohibitory manner only'.' indicates that the state may, under the
standards and conditions imposed by the court, prohibit through regulation certain onreservation acts by non-Indians which may be permitted by the tribe. The state may not,
however, permit non-Indian on-reservation acts not allowed by the tribe, i.e., enforcing
open seasons when the tribe chooses to observe a closed season. 424 F. Supp. at 975.
121. [d. at 977.
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prohibited from entering the reservation without the express
permission of the Quechan Tribe.t 22 Both sides appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.

B.

NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

On appeal, California argued that the enforcement of state
fish and game laws against non-Indians on the reservation did
not infringe on the Quechan Tribe's right of self-government.
California maintained that state regulation of non-Indian onreservation hunting and fishing was not preempted by federal
statute or by specific tribal regulations. Thus, the state
contended that it had . the right to enter the reservation to
enforce state fish and game laws against non-Indians. '23 The
Quechan Tribe, on the other hand, contended that the state's
fish and game laws were preempted on the reservation by the
tribe's regulations, and by the intent of Congress that the tribe,
not the state, regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing. '24 The
tribe argued that the case should be remanded to the district
court for consideration of newly adopted tribal fish and game
ordinances. In a decisive argument not presented to the district
court, the tribe contended that sovereign immunity protected it
from suit if California brought the action without the express
consent of Congress.
Since the tribe's claim of sovereign immunity represented a
challenge to the court's jurisdiction, that question was considered
first. The court noted that the application of sovereign immunity
is not a discretionary remedy, but instead represents a right which
courts must recognize. m The appellate courts compared tribal
sovereign immunity to that of the United States, noting that
"neither can be sued without the consent of Congress."128 The
panel concluded that sovereign immunity barred this suit.
The court rejected California's arguments that the facts were
sufficiently unique for the court to refuse to apply the doctrine of

122. [d.

123. 595 F.2d at 1154.
124. [d.
125. [d. at 1155.
126. [d.
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sovereign immunity, and that Public Law 280 127 represented an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress. Even where
Congress consents to a suit, the court observed, the abrogation of
the immunity is limited by any conditions that Congress
imposes.t 28 A waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress may not
be implied, but must be "unequivocally expressed."129 The court
found that the significance of a suit being initiated by a state
rather than by a non-government plaintiff was transcended by the
tribal right to immunity. Although sympathizing with the state's
need to establish the extent of its authority, the court noted that
"the desirability for complete settlement of all issues . . . must
... yield to the principle of immunity,139 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the state's contention that unless Public Law 280
were interpreted as a congressional waiver of the tribal sovereign
immunity, the question of whether Public Law 280 provided the
state authority to regulate non-Indian on-reservation hunting and
fishing would be permanently precluded from judicial resolution.
The panel found nothing in the language or legislative history of
Public Law 280 indicating the intent of Congress to waive tribal
sovereign immunity. The court observed that tribal immunity
only bars judicial determination where suit is brought against only
the tribe itself.t31
Since the finding of sovereign immunity precluded consideration of any other issues on appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated
the district court judgment, and remanded the case to the lower
court for dismissal. 132

C.

SIGNIFICANCE

In Quechan, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional
federal Indian law doctrine that as a quasi~sovereign entity, an
Indian tribe possesses an immunity from suit similar to that of
the United States. Although Congress may abrogate the tribal
immunity and consent to a suit against a tribe, the abrogation is

127. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1964). See note 5 supra.
128. [d.
129. [d.
130. [d., quoting United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506
(1940).
131. 595 F.2d at 1156.
132. [d. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79·1128).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

23

338

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 12

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:315

limited by any congressionally imposed conditions. The waiver
of tribal sovereign immunity may not be implied, but must be
unequivocally expressed.
The finding by the Ninth Circuit that in considering
sovereign immunity it is irrelevant that the action was initiated
by a state government is significant to the continuing interaction
of state and tribal governments. Equally important is the
appellate court's recognition that sovereign immunity from suit
is a right, not a discretionary remedy. The affirmation of this
principle provides a valuable guarantee that an Indian tribe's
economic resources will not be consumed in defending legal
actions testing tribal rights, whether brought by individuals or
by state governments.
V.

UNITED STATES V. JACKSON: TRIBAL REGULATION
OF MEMBER ON-RESERVATION ACTIVITIES

In United States v. Jackson l33 the Ninth Circuit considered
the effect of an Indian tribe's failure to exercise a reserved right.
The appellate court reviewed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,
and considered whether the failure to exercise a tribal right
results in its termination, or permits its assumption by the
United States, even in the absence of an express intent by
Congress to do so.

A.

BACKGROUND

The defendant, Donald Jackson, was an enrolled member of
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation. Being of
less than one-fourth tribal blood, he was enrolled in a tribal
membership classification which did not entitle him to
participate in any rights arising out of tribal treaties, including
hunting. Jackson was arrested for hunting on the reservation
without tribal permission, and was prosecuted and convicted in
federal district court under 18 U .S.C. section 1165,134 He did not
deny hunting on the reservation without tribal permission, but
appealed on the ground that article IVI35 of the tribal constitution,
133. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. July, 1979) (per Wright, J.; other panel members were
Tang, J., and Palmieri, D.J.).
134. For the relevant language of § 1165, see note 115 8upra.
135. Article IV of the Tribe's constitution states:
The membership of the Confederated Tribes shall consist, as
follows, of: (a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear
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which divides tribe members into three classifications, violated
his right to equal protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968. 138
B.

NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether 18
U.S.C. section 1165 provides federal courts with jurisdiction over
acts committed by an Indian on an Indian reservation against
the property of another Indian. Concluding that Congress did
not intend the statute to be an exception to the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribes over their members, the appellate court
reversed the district court conviction without considering the
defendant's equal protection claim. 137
The Ninth Circuit panel observed that although Indian
tribes have inherent sovereignty over internal affairs, it "is of a
unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers."138 The power to enact and enforce tribal laws over tribe
on the official census roll of the Confederated Tribes as of July
1, 1949; provided that correctio~ may be made in said roll by
the General Council within five (5) years from the adoption
and approval of this Constitution and By·Laws, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized rep·
resentative. (b) All children born to enrollees of the Confederated Tribes, who are at least one-fourth (1;') degree of blood of
the Confederated Tribes. Where only one parent of such children is an enrollee of the Confederated Tribes, the children
may become members only upon application accepted by the
General Council. (c) Any other person of blood of the
Confederated Tribes may, upon application, be admitted by a
majority vote of the General Council to participate in tribal
government and to vote and to hold office. It is expressly
understood, however, that such persons shall not participate in
any right or claim arising out of treaties to which the
Confederated Tribes are a party.
60(lF.2d 1283, 1284 n.1.
136. Act of April 11, 1968,25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970). Also referred to as the Indian
Bill of Rights, this statute was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Indian
Civil Rights Act was intended to afford individual Indians protection from deprivation of
their rights by Indian tribes. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil
Rights' Act, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 557 (1972). The "due process" and "equal protection" clause
of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), has been controversial, and court interpretations have
varied. See Note, Indian Law Overview, Ninth Circuit Survey, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
313, 313-21 (1976).
137. 600 F.2d at 1285-86.
138. Id.
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members is part of the tribe's inherent sovereignty. While
Congress placed certain serious offenses under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts when it enacted the Major
Crimes Act,13' hunting on a reservation without a tribe's
permission was not among the offenses included. The court
observed that the Act, in extending "the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses. . . to the Indian
Country"140 contains exceptions, including one for "offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or. property of
another Indian."141 "[E]xcept for the offenses enumerated in
[section 1153], all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against
other Indians within Indian Country are subject to the jurisdiction
of tribal courts."142 Under this interpretation, Jackson would be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court for hunting
on the reservation without tribal permission. Thus, the federal
district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. 143
The United States argued that the language of section 1165
appeared to apply to both Indians and non-Indians, therefore
including Indians within the jurisdiction transferred from Indian
tribes to the federal govemment. 144 To support this interpretation,
the United States cited the statute which section 1165 replaced:
[I]f any person, other than an Indian, shall,
within the limits of any tribe with whom the
United States shall have existing treaties, hunt, or
trap, or take and destroy, any peltries or game,
except for subsistence in the Indian Country, such
person shall forfeit the sum of five hundred
dollars, and forfeit all the traps, guns and
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The Major Crimes Act represented Congress' reaction to
the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), that federal courts
had no jurisdiction over the on-reservation murder of an Indian by another Indian. See
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 363. The Major Crimes Act of 1885 gave the
United States jurisdiction on Indian reservations for certain enumerated serious offenses.
Offenses which are committed by one Indian against another Indian, and which are not
listed in the Act are "subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts." United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977). But see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973),
cited with explanation, 600 F.2d 1286 n.8.
140. 600 F.2d at 1286.
141. [d.
142. [d., quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977).
143. 600 F.2d at 1287, 1288.
144. [d. at 1286.
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ammunition in his possession, used or procured to
be used for that purpose, and peltries so taken. 145

The United States argued that the deletion of the phrase
"other than an Indian" from section 1165 reflected the intent of
Congress to apply the section to Indians on reservations. I.e
In rejecting this argument, the appellate court, relying on
legislative history, noted that other changes included in section
1165 indicated that Congress intended to include under federal
jurisdiction only non-Indian hunting and fishing, which would
not be subject to tribal jurisdiction or authority.147
The United States, in an argument rejected by the court,
maintained that in the absence of a tribal procedure to respond
to hunting violations by Group C tribal members, like the
defendant Jackson, the group came under federal jurisdiction, as
did non-Indians who were outside the tribe's jurisdiction. u8 This
contention "confuse [d] jurisdiction with enforcement
procedures."uB The lack of an established system of punishment
did not indicate the absence of power, but rather, showed merely
that the tribe had failed to exercise the jurisdiction it held. 150
Finding that the defendant's offense was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and
remanded the case to the lower court to be dismissed.151

C.

SIGNIFICANCE

In United States v. Jackson, the Ninth Circuit again reviewed
the concept of limited tribal sovereignty. The importance of the
case rests in the court's application of the principle of reserved
rights and its refusal to allow federal jurisdiction to automatically
fill a perceived vacuum. The court reaffirmed the Winans doctrine
of reserved rights l52 which states that, whether exercised or not,
unless a tribal right is relinquished by the tribe, or extinguished by
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Ch. 161, § 8, 4 Stat. 730 (1834) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 216 (repealed 1960».
600 F.2d at 1287.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1288.
[d.
[d.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying notes 27 &

28 supra.
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Congress, it continues.
Tribes seeking to implement procedures for on-reservation
autonomy and tribal self-determination will find the Ninth
Circuit decision in this case noteworthy: a tribe's failure to
exercise its jurisdictional power as a quasi-sovereign does not, in
itself, result in the loss of that power, or its transfer to federal or
state government. Those tribal rights and powers not relinquished
by the tribe, or specifically terminated by Congress. are retained,
and merely require exercise by the tribe to become effective.
VI.

UNITED STATES V. MONTANA: TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY - THE POWER TO EXCLUDE

In United States u. Montana,153 the Ninth Circuit considered
a direct conflict between a claim of inherent state sovereignty
over territory within state boundaries, and federal and Indian
tribal sovereignty over the same land. l54 The court noted that the
issue was "close,"I55 and in reaching its decision reviewed the
principles of treaty interpretation, federal preemption, tribal and
state sovereignty and the effect of alienation of on-reservation
land to non-tribal members.
In an effort to reach an equitable resolution of the
conflicting claims, the Ninth Circuit panel departed from strict
principles of federal Indian law, noting in a postscript that its
"holdings reflect a degree of precision not always present in the
sources on which [the court] must rely."15B The court reached a
compromise which is appealing in theory but unfortunate in its
failure to maintain principles of interpretation necessary to
153. 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979) (modified on denial of rehearing) (per curiam),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980) (No. 79-1128). Subsequent to the date of opinion, Montana petitioned for rehearing on the basis of the
Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 99 S.Ct. 2529 (1979). The state
argued that Wilson required the adoption of state law as a part of federal common law in
determining the proper upper limit of the Big Hom bed and banks. See note 165 infra and
accompanying text. In a per curiam opinion denying the petition for rehearing, the Ninth
Circuit found that applying state law would frustrate the "federal policy and functions"
and therefore declined to alter the original opinion. 604 F.2d 1173-74. As this issue is not
directly related to the topic of this Note, textual discussion is omitted.
154. [d. at 1164.
155. [d. at 1166.
156. [d. at 1172.
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increase certainty in federal Indian law cases.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Crow Indian Reservation is a tract of land recognized in
the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie 157 as belonging to the Crow
Tribe. A subsequent treaty with the Crow Indians in 1868 158
designated approximately eight million acres of land as a
reservation for the tribe. In a series of Congressional acts, the
size of the reservation was decreased, and today it consists of
approximately two million acres. Passing through the reservation
is the Big Horn River, a navigable waterway. While entering into
the treaties with the Crow Tribe and establishing the Crow
Reservation, the United States claimed title to the bed and
banks of the Big Horn River as public lands. 15u Montana
contended that jurisdiction over the river and the river banks
passed to the state when Montana entered the Union. leo
Both federal and state agencies were involved in developing
fishing on the Big Horn River. In 1970, the Crow Tribe entered
into an agreement with the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and
Wildlife, a federal agency, to aid the tribe in developing and
managing the reservation fishing resources, and to stock the
waters of the Big Horn River and the Big Horn Canyon
Recreation Area. In addition to this program, Montana had
stocked the waters of the Crow Reservation with fish since 1928.
The State Department of Fish and Game also conducted wildlife
studies on the Big Horn River, with no objection from the Crow
Tribe or from the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs.
In 1973, the Crow Tribal Council enacted Tribal Resolution
74-05 181 which prohibited anyone other than a member of the
157. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1852) (hereinafter Treaty of 1851).
158. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 649 (1868).
159. United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599, 601 (D. Mont. 1978).
160. [d.

161. Crow Tribal Council Resolution 74-05 states in part:
Be it ordained by the Crow Tribe, meeting in a duly held and
noticed council that hunting, fishing and trespassing within
the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation is
hereby prohibited and the proper officials of the United States
and the Crow Tribe of Indians are hereby directed and author·
ized to enforce the provisions of this ordinance and any federal
statute which would prohibit such hunting and fishing and
trespassing, provided, however, that the provisions of this ordi·
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Crow Tribe from hunting or fishing on the reservation. Montana
continued to authorize on-reservation hunting and fishing by
non-Indians after the closing of the reservation to these
activities, and to issue licenses to non-members of the Crow
Tribe. The Crow Tribe, joined by the United States, brought an
action in federal district court seeking a declaration that title to
the bed and banks of the Big Horn River within the Crow
Reservation was held by the United States in trust for the Crow
Tribe. lez The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Crow
Tribe had the power to prohibit non-members of the tribe from
hunting or fishing on the reservation, and that the state had no
authority to regulate hunting or fishing by non-Indians on the
Indian land. ISS
The district court exhaustively reviewed the history of the
Crow Tribe and the legislative history of the Congressional acts
affecting the reservation. The lower court held that Montana
possessed title to the bed and banks of the river, and had the
power and authority to regulate on-reservation hunting and
fishing by non-Indians, including the application of state fish
and game laws to these individuals. Ie. The Crow Tribe, again
joined by the United States, appealed the lower court findings to
the Ninth Circuit.
B.

NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

The Ninth Circuit considered the issues raised in the district
court, and the additional issue of whether the Crow Tribe could
regulate or prohibit on-reservation hunting and fishing activities
by non-Indians who possess fee patent land within the
reservation boundaries. In reaching its four-part holding, the
appellate court observed that title claims to the bed and banks
of the Big Horn River had already been settled in the Ninth
Circuit when they found that the bed and banks of the Big Horn
nance shall not apply to the members of the Crow Tribe of
Indians.
Be it further resolved, that the Crow Tribal officials inform the State Fish and Game Department for the State of
Montana and Bureau of Indian Affairs (United States Department of Interior) that hunting and fishing on the Crow Reservation is hereby closed.
604 F.2d at 1164 n.4.
162. 457 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Mont. 1978).
163. 1d.
164. 1d. at 611.
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River up to the ordinary high water mark was held by the United
States in trust for the Crow Tribe. 185
Considering the validity of Crow Tribal Regulation 74-05,
which closed the reservation to non-Indian hunting and fishing,
the court found that the treaties of 1851 and 1868 empowered the
tribe to exclude non-members from the reservation lands for any
purpose.1 88 In support of this interpretation, the court cited a
previous Ninth Circuit decision holding that "the right of
Indians to control hunting, trapping and fishing on their lands is
a prerogative of ownership which the United States recognizes as
a matter of federallaw."187 Although affirming its earlier holding,
the court observed in a footnote to the Montana decision that to
the extent that any Crow Tribal Resolution was in conflict with
the Supreme Court rejection in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe l88
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-indians, the Crow Tribal
Resolution was invalid. 188
The Ninth Circuit next considered the question of tribal
power to prohibit on-reservation hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Crow Tribe who owned fee patent lands on the
reservation, an issue not raised in the district court. The Crow
Tribe purported to exclude all non-tribe members from onreservation hunting and fishing. Noting that the 1887 General
Allotment Act and the Crow Allotment Act of 1920 provided that
lands within the reservation could be sold to non-Indians as fee
patent grants, the court stated' that "it defies reason to suppose
that Congress intended that non-members who reside on fee
165. 604 F.2d 1162, 1166, citing United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 831 (9th
Cir: 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977):The Montana court distinguished
its earlier decision in California v. Quechan Tribe ofIndians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979),
see section IV supra, noting that because the Crow Tribe itself brought suit, sovereign
immunity did not apply. 604 F.2d at 1165 n.5.
166. [d. at 1169.
167. [d. at 1167, quoting United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 834 (9th Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977). The Ninth Circuit noted that "[a]lthough
the Supreme Court vacated our decision on double jeopardy grounds, ... our analysis of
the title issue was in no way questioned." United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d at 1166
n.6.
168. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
169. 604 F.2d at 1167 n.7. Crow Tribal Resolution 75-17b purported to grant criminal
jurisdiction to the Crow Tribe over non-Indians committing offenses on the reservation.
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty
of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try nonIndian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress." 435
U.S. 191, 210.
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patent lands could hunt and fish thereon only by consent of the
tribe."170 Although finding that neither of the allotment acts
explicitly qualified the tribe's rights to regulate hunting and
fishing, and acknowledging that treaty right alteration is not to
be lightly imputed to Congress,171 the court nevertheless found
that the exclusion of non-tribe members who resided on fee
patent land on the reservation exceeded the powers of the Crow
Tribe authorized by the treaties and by Congressional act.172 The
court, therefore, held that Crow Tribal Regulation 74-05 was
invalid only insofar as it applied to hunting and fishing by nontribal members who residel'on their own fee patent land. 173 Nonmember fee patent land owners who did not reside on the land
could be excluded from hunting and fishing on their own land by
the tribe. The tribal exclusion from these activities on other
parts of the reservation was not affected.
This limited modification of a treaty right resulted from the
court's recognition that those who live on the land in the West
"are likely to regard hunting and fishing thereon to be as natural
and ordinary as working, sleeping and eating" but that those
who do not live on the land are "somewhat less inclined" to the
activities. 174 Non-resident fee patent land owners were therefore
not exempt from the prohibition contained in Tribal Regulation.
74-05. Supporting its finding, the court reasoned: "[W]e must
. . . live together, a process not enhanced by unbending
insistence on supposed legal rights which if found to exist may
well yield tainted gains helpful neither to Indians nor nonIndians."175
The court next considered the respective powers of the Crow
Tribe and Montana to regulate on-reservation hunting and
fishing by non-members of the Crow Tribe. The court noted that
the private landowner has the power to exclude others from
hunting and fishing on that land, and observed that the Crow
Tribe is more than a mere owner, possessing "attributes of
sovereignty over both [its] members and their territory."178 The
170.
171.
(1968).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

604 F.2d at 1168.
Id., citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413
604 F.2d at 1167.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id., quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). The Montana
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court also observed that this sovereignty is limited, and "exists
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance."177 An earlier Ninth Circuit decision, where an
Indian tribe sought to prevent local law enforcement officers
from entering a reservation, the tribe was found to have the
power to
exercise several types of authority over nonmembers who enter the reservation to hunt or
fish. These are the rights to determine who may
enter the reservation; to define the conditions
upon which they may enter; to prescribe rules of
conduct; to expel those who enter the reservation
without proper authority or those who violate
tribal, state or federal laws; to refer those who
violate state or federal laws to state or federal
officials; and to designate officials responsible for
effectuating the foregoing. 17s

The tribe could not, however, assert criminal jurisdiction over
non-member tribal law violators, or confiscate a non-member's
property as a consequence of a tribal law violation.

In an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court accepted the
. finding of the Montana Supreme Court that the state could
enforce its game laws on non-tribal members from on-reservation
hunting and fishing unless precluded by an act of Congress, or
unless it would interfere with the efforts of the tribe to affect
self-government on the reservation. 17t The conservation of
wildlife resources and the improvement of fish and game
required the cooperation of the federal government, the Crow
Tribe and the state. On the basis of this necessary cooperation,
the court held that the Crow Tribe may, to the degree that nonmember on-reservation hunting and fishing is permitted by the
tribe, set seasons and limits for fish and game, as the tribe feels
appropriate.'so The tribe could not, however, subject nonmembers to the criminal processes of tribal courts. The tribe
could impose fees on non-members for the privilege of hunting or
panel cited its earlier decision in Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation
v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979), noting that dual regulation of hunting and
fishing on Indian reservations is not unknown. 604 F.2d at 1171.
177. Id.
178. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976).
179. United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976), affirming State v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689, 692-93 (1967).
ISO. 604 F.2d at 1171.
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fishing on reservation lands, or completely exclude them, but
could not confiscate the property of non-Indians found in
violation of tribal or other laws. 181 Montana could regulate the
non-tribal member on-reservation hunting and fishing in a
prohibitory manner only,.82 and could apply relevant state fish
and game laws to the extent that they were at least as restrictive
as tribal regulations. Having reversed the holding of the district
court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to enter judgment in keeping with the appellate court's
holdings. 183
C.

SIGNIFICANCE

In United States v. Montana, the Ninth Circuit panel was
confronted with a direct conflict between the inherent right of
the Crow Tribe to exclude non-tribal members from hunting and
fishing on its reservation, and the right of non-tribal member
resident owners of on-reservation fee patent lands to hunt and
fish on their own land. The court sought an equitable compromise between the conflicting rights. It therefore limited the
tribe's power to exclude, but only in regard to the nonmember reservation land owners, and only on their own land. The
tribe's right to exclude others from the reservation was affirmed.
The court analyzed the original treaties in the context of
subsequent Congressional acts, concluding that, though not
expressly stated, Congress intended to limit the right of the
Crow Tribe to exclude by sanctioning the sale of reservation
lands to non-tribal members. The Ninth Circuit panel failed to
apply the federal Indian law principle that Indian treaty rights
may be modified or abrogated only when Congress has expressly
indicated the intent to do so. At this time of rapid development
in Indian law, well delineated principles of law are needed to
standardize the adjudication of similar issues, and to increase
the predictability of their resolution. The court's application of
the express abrogation doctrine l84 might have resulted in the
finding that in the absence of an express statement modifying
tribal rights in subsequent Congressional acts, the tribe could
181.
182.
183.
184.

[d.
See note 120 supra.
604 F.2d at 1172-73.
See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
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exercise its reserved right to exclude even fee patent land
residents from hunting or fishing on their own land. Recognizing
hunting and fishing as property rights,IS5 the court might then
have required compensation be paid to the landowners by the
Crow Tribe if their rights were abrogated.
In support of its decision, the court stated: "We [Indians
and non-Indians] must, however, live together, a process not
el}hanced by an unbending insistence on supposed legal rights
which if found to exist may well yield tainted gains helpful
neither to Indians nor to non-Indians."ls8 This statement,
although eloquent in its intent to reflect equity and justice, and
appealing in its reason, also represents the continuation of the
practice of interpreting treaties on the basis of implication, often
using current standards, rather than by. the application of
standardized rules of interpretation. The Ninth Circuit appeared
aware of the potential threat this practice poses, adding a
postscript which indicated the limited nature of its modification
of the tribal right, and reflected frustration at having to resolve
issues left unclear by Congress. IS7 The court's decision is in
accord with its finding in Kimball III88 that the alienation of
former reservation lands to non-Indians results in the alteration
of treaty rights from exclusive to non-exclusive on those lands;
the Montana panel appropriately construed its holding narrowly,1su The efforts of the Ninth Circuit to clarify and limit its
holding may indicate that the court recognized the direct con-flict
of rights requiring a compromise between strict law and
equity, rather than that the court rejected use of objective
standards of construction in federal Indian law. The question
whether the Ninth Circuit will adopt the requirement that treaty
rights may only be altered by an express statement by Congress,
as a strict standard, will have to await a case without rights
conflicting.
185. Hunting and fishing rights are property within the meaning of the fifth amend·
ment, and must be compensated for if limited or abrogated. See Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 388 F.2d 998 (Ct. CI. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Hynes v.
Grimes Packing Co., 377 U.S. 86, 105 (1949).
186. 604 F.2d at 1169.
187. [d. at 1172.
188. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979); see discussion at III supra.
189. "When cessions are made or rights are extinguished they are to be construed
narrowly as affecting only matters specifically mentioned." FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra
note 5, at xxi.
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VII.

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COL VILLE
INDIAN RESERVATION V. WASHINGTON:
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v.
Washington Ito (Confederated Tribes), the Ninth Circuit, in a
decision marked by a dissent, again considered the power of a
state to enforce its fish and game laws on non-Indians engaged in
on-reservation hunting and fishing. A majority of the panel
members applied federal preemption doctrine rather than
principles of Indian tribal sovereignty. Its analysis focused on
whether state on-reservation fish and game regulation of nonIndians had been expressly preempted by Congress or the
Confederated Tribes, or whether the state's action would
represent an obstacle to federal policy. The dissent also applied
federal preemption principles but reached a contrary decision.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Colville Indian Reservation in eastern Washington was
established by Executive Order in 1872.ltl The Colville Tribes
enacted a constitution and bylaws in 1938, providing a fourteenmember business council as the tribes' governing body. The
tribes owned a resort located on the reservation, and encouraged
tourism and non-Indian sport fishing on the reservation. The
United States Fish and Wildlife Service aided in keeping
reservation waters stocked with fish. The tribes enacted
ordinances requiring that non-Indians entering the reservation to
fish purchase a tribal fishing license, but not requiring a
Washington state license.
In 1975, Washington game enforcement officers entered the
Colville Reservation and issued citations to non-Indians found
fishing without state licenses. Tribal police officers contested the
state's authority to issue citations on the reservation, and the
state officers departed. The tribes brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that Washington had no authority to
regulate any fishing on the reservation, and a permanent
injunction against state regulation on the reservation.
190. 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy, J.; Duniway, J., dissenting; the
other panel member was Grant, D.J.):
191. Executive Order of July 2, 1872 reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 916.
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The district court opinion cited Supreme Court dicta that
"the trend had been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal preemption."lt2 The court also noted that Indian hunting
and fishing rights are implied in agreements establishing
reservations, and that these rights are exclusive on reservation
lands unless clearly relinquished by the tribes. Being inherent
and not granted, these rights are presumed reserved, unless
relinquished, whether the reservation was created by treaty or by
executive order. The district court found that the United States
had preempted state regulation of fishing on the Colville
Reservation by assuming that jurisdiction when the reservation
was formed, and had delegated that power to the Colville Tribes.
Therefore, it held that the state's power to "regulate or control
fishing by Indians or non-Indians on the Colville Reservation"IU3
was preempted, and the state lacked jurisdiction. Washington
appealed, and the case came before the Ninth Circuit.
B.

NINTH

CIRcurr's

MAJORITY OPINION

The appellate court, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the decision
of the district court, and held that the state was not precluded
from requiring non-Indians to purchase state licenses to fish on
the Colville Reservation, or from imposing state regulations
equal to or more restrictive than those applied by the tribes to
Indians and non-Indians fishing on the reservation. lU4 The
majority noted that the district court had stated the applicable
rule of federal preemption, and appropriately interpreted the
effect of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution;
however, the majority disagreed with the lower court's
conclusion that tribal regulations preempted state regulation. 195
The Supreme Court had stated that the purpose of the
supremacy clause is to invalidate those state laws which stand
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,IUB and that "[e]nactments of
the federal government passed to protect and guard its Indian
wards only affect the operation. . . of such state laws as conflict
192. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 412 F.
Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Wash. 1976) rev'd, 591 F.2d 89, quoting McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
193. 412 F. Supp. at 656.
194. 591 F.2d at 92.
195. [d. at 91.
196. 591 F.2d at 91, ~iting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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with the federal enactments."IU7 The appellate court further
noted the Supreme Court finding that:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it
should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be
presumed that a federal statute was intended to
supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention
to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed. IDS

Having reviewed federal preemption doctrine, the court
considered whether state fish and game regulation on the
Colville Reservation had been preempted. The majority found
that the tribes had conceded state jurisdiction would not
represent an obstacle to their program of developing and
regulating on-reservation fishing, citing a provision of the
Colville Tribal Hunting and Fishing Code, which stated "where
tribal ll!w is more restrictive than state law the tribal law shall
prevail."IDD This provision was interpreted as an effort by the
tribes to aid and support state law game enforcement, rather
than as an indication that state law should never apply. The
court found support in tribal council resolutions that limited the
scope of tribal permits to the state's definition of fishable waters,
and that provided the tribal "[flishing season shall be identical
to the Washington State Fishing Season."200 The court took note
that the resolutions regarding tribal fishing permits stated that
"[t]he permittee must have appropriate. State of Washington
Hunting and Fishing license and must comply with State seasons,
species and limitations as required by State law. "201 The
court concluded that the program developed by the tribal
council allowed for dual state-federal jurisdiction, and did not
indicate the intent to preempt state action.
The majority saw the issues as narrow ones, since
Washington, in keeping with Quechan Tribe of Indians u.
Rowe,202 had conceded that tribal members were free of state
regulation on the reservation, and that the tribes could either
197. 591 F.2d at 91, citing Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
198: 591 F.2d at 91, citing New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
413 (1973).
199. 591 F.2d at 91.
200. [d.
201. [d. at 92.
202. 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
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charge a fee for non-Indian fishing, or close the reservation lands
to non-Indians completely. The state sought only the authority
to apply state licensing requirements to non-Indians fishing on
the reservation, claiming only the authority to apply prohibitory
regulations, not to authorize activity prohibited by tribal
regulations. The majority concluded that no clear manifestation
of Congressional or tribal intent to preempt regulation by
Washington was present, and that there had been no showing
that state regulation presel)ted an obstacle to achieving any
federal policy. The court observed: "[W]e need not decide now
whether tribal efforts if made to preempt the State would be
consistent with Congressional intent, or whether such efforts, if
consistent with congressional goals, would preempt state
regulation."203 The Ninth Circuit, having rejected the findings of
the district court, reversed the lower court judgment.
C.

THE DISSENT

The dissent would have affirmed the lower court finding
that the enactment by the Colville Tribes of a comprehensive
program for administering on-reservation fishing preempted
state regulation. Contending that there was no requirement for
express premption in law, the dissent concluded that the tribes'
resolutions made the intent to preempt state on-reservation
regulation of non-Indian fishing sufficiently clear. The evidence
cited by the majority supported a clear manifestation of the
tribes' efforts to adopt their own regulations and to preempt
the state. The dissent suggested that tribal adoption of the
state fishing season was "merely a convenient shorthand. "204
Similarly, the wording of the tribal permit, indicating that the
permittee must also possess a state hunting or fishing license,
could as readily have been interpreted as a warning of what the
"state says it requires"206 as the majority's finding, that it
represented a recognition by the tribe that the state was entitled
to require it. Finally, the dissent observed that hunting and
fishing have historically been the basis of Indian survival, and
argued that these rights have always been within the powers of
Indian tribes to regulate. Concluding that the exercise of
enforcement powers by the Colville Tribes preempted the power
of Washington to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing by
203. 591 F.2d at 92.
204. [d. at 93 (Duniway, J., dissenting).
205. [d. at 94.
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non-tribal members, the dissent indicated that the district court
decision should have been affirmed.
D.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Ninth Circuit's application of federal preemption
principles as the primary determinant of the issue of state
jurisdiction in regulating non-Indian on-reservation hunting and
fishing represents a serious threat to the efforts of Indian tribes
to institute self-government. As applied by the majority in
Confederated Tribes, federal preemption doctrine, originally
used in federal Indian law to protect Indian tribes from state
encroachment and taxation of Indian property, appears to
replace the Winans206 doctrine of reserved rights. The Winans
doctrine, by which tribal rights continue unless expressly
abrogated by Congress, is in direct contrast to this theory of the
preemption doctrine, which affords states the opportunity to
assume tribal powers unless the tribe or Congress expressly and
clearly manifests the intent to preempt the state action. This
subtle shift in the burden of manifesting a clear and express
intent represents a rejection of the federal Indian law principle
that Indian tribal rights are not grants from the United States,
but powers which derive from an original sovereignty and are
reserved unless expressly abrogated by Congress.
Most harmful is the implication that an Indian tribe is a
mere federal instrumentality.207 This interpretation, rather than
representing a shield from state taxation of federal entities,
subjects Indian tribes to the restraints placed on federal agencies
to prevent federal usurpation of those powers reserved to the
states. In contrasting states' rights with Indian tribal rights, and
defining an Indian tribe as a federal instrumentality, the Ninth
Circuit establishes the supremacy of the states except in those .
areas where the state is expressly preempted by the Constitution, or by an act of Congress. Although implying in this case
that a clearly expressed intent by an Indian tribe to preempt
the action of a state could be adjudged adequate to receive
judicial support, it appears that the Ninth Circuit will inter206. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see text accompanying notes 27
& 28 supra.

207. See generally Kissel, The Ninth Circuit's Federal Instrumentality Doctrine-A
Threat to Tribal Sovereignty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358 (1978).
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pret all but the most strident indications of intent as insufficient.
The application of federal Indian law principles to the issues
raised in this case would require a holding contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's. In the absence of an express abrogation of a tribal right
by Congress, or the express delegation of jurisdiction to a state,
neither of which occurred in this case, the regulation of onreservation fishing by both Indians and non-Indians should be
reserved to the tribes.
The application of federal preemption requirements, and the
apparent extension of the federal instrumentality doctrine to
jurisdiction issues between an Indian tribe and a state may
represent the most serious threat to Indian rights since the
federal termination policy. It is of particular concern that the
threat emanates from the judiciary, which has traditionally
emanates represented the single source of protection for Indian
tribal rights.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court first considered a conflict
arising from the effort of a state to enforce its game laws on an
Indian exercising a claimed treaty right to hunt in 1896. 208 Since
that date, tribes and individual Indians have repeatedly turned
to the federal courts for protection of their traditional hunting
and fishing rights. This repeated return to the courts, expending
personal and often limited tribal resources, reflects Indian
determination to maintain rights often viewed as basic to their
culture. Tribes seeking to augment tribal income by developing
on-reservation wildlife resources are increasingly confronted by
state attempts to share in the proceeds derived from hunting and
fishing, or state efforts to enforce its regulations to conserve a
resource endangered by over-exploitation.
The issues confronting the courts are complex. No law of
general application defines or governs the hunting and fishing
rights of all Indians. Treaties and agreements made with various
tribes over a period of two centuries differ in significant detail
and reflect the often conflicting policies of the United States,
which have fluctuated between the forced assimilation of Indians
208. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
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and the protection of their rights and culture. Promises made to
Indian tribes in return for the cession of tribal land sometimes
reflect the naivete or avarice of the negotiators, while the often
unpopular decisions of the courts indicate the difficulty of
constructing an equitable interpretation of early treaties or
agreements in modern terms.
The competition for a limited resource has resulted in
conflicts so severe that they are often reflected by confrontations
outside of the courtroom. From the Hoopa Reservation of
California and the Puyallup Reservation of Washington, to the
Cherokee Reservation of North Carolina, Indians and nonIndians have attempted to resolve the issues in increasingly
violent interactions. In the Northwest, the conflict over Indian
treaty fishing rights has resulted in what has been termed the
most significant challenge to federal authority and supremacy by
a state since the Civil War.zoe
The absence of an adequately developed body of Indian law
further confounds judicial efforts to resolve the issues. The
variations in initial federal dealings with Indian tribes and the
absence of consistently applied general principles of interpretation result in an uncertainty which requires the repeated
judicial hearing of similar issues.
During the last term, the Ninth Circuit considered Indian
hunting and fishing rights in five cases reviewed in this article.
In three of the cases,210 the court of appeals applied traditional
principles of federal Indian law in considering the issues and
reached findings consonant with the development of predictability in Indian law. In the fourth case,211 however, the
court found justification for failing to adopt a standard which
lessens the danger of inconsistent interpretation of similar issues
209. Cf. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123,
1126, (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (1979) (In this Indian
fishing rights decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that "except for some desegregation cases
... the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century."). See also Petty, Accomodation of Indian Treaty Rights in an International Fishery: An International Problem Begging for an International Solution, 54 WASH. L. REv. 403 n.3 (1979).
210. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768; California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595
F.2d 1153; United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283.
211. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162.
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by different courts. In the fifth case,212 the Ninth Circuit
continued a trend away from established federal Indian law,
applying instead the doctrine of federal peemption as the
primary determinant of an Indian tribe and state conflict. The
expansion of this theory of interpretation with the corollary use
of federal instrumentality doctrine represents a significant threat
to the concept of tribal sovereignty and the efforts of Indian
tribes to preserve on-reservation autonomy and self-government.

Ben E. Fox
212. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d
89.
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